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Dumenil-Levy and Foley (DLF) attempt to show that the falling rate of profit can be induced by applying Okishio's criterion of technical choice to DLF's framework on the evolution of potential technical change. This paper examines what would happen if Shaikh's criterion is applied to DLF's framework on the evolution of potential technical change. The following result is derived: while both criteria induce the K/L (capital-labor ratio) — increasing falling rate of profit at a sufficiently high wage share, only Shaikh's criterion induces the K/L — increasing falling rate of profit under a constant real wage (or a low wage share).

Okishio’s theorem plays an important role in modern discussions of Marx’s argument on the long-run tendency for the rate of profit to fall. Even though there is substantial literature dealing with Okishio’s theorem, there has been little discussion of Okishio’s theorem from an empirical perspective. This paper makes an attempt to empirically test Okishio’s criterion of technical choice, which is an important assumption of Okishio’s theorem. By using the World Penn Tables data on selected OECD countries, I will consider how well Okishio’s criterion of technical choice predicts the evolution of actual capitalist economies.

Below we use data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) and Fixed Assets Tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA); and the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve (for financial variables and tangible assets). We consider the U.S. non-financial corporate sector for which appropriate data is available (and the U.S. domestic private economy for a comparison with Park’s calculation).

The purpose of this paper is to examine regional voting patterns in South Korea using the results from six presidential elections since the 1990s.

A χ² test was used to determine the municipalities where a regional voting pattern emerged, and λ correlation coefficients were calculated to examine changes in the regional voting patterns.

The analyses lead to three key findings. First, voting patterns differ in Yeongnam and Honam: regional voting in Yeongnam is getting weaker, it remains strong in Honam. Second, the tendency to vote along regional lines decreased significantly in the election in which the Honam party fielded a candidate with a Yeongnam appeared identity. Third, regional voting patterns declined but then stabilized at a constant level, regardless of the candidates’ local identity, which was confirmed in “Bu-Ul-Gyeong.”

This paper can empirically verify the manifestation of regional voting pattern and confirm the trend. It is possible to derive a condition for suppressing the regional voting pattern.